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The ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law:
Reshaping the European Varieties of Capitalism

By Peer Zumbansen & Daniel Saam*

A. Introduction
On its website "The EU Single Market - Fewer barriers, more opportunities"1 , the
European Commission lists the judgments by the European Court of Justice [ECJ]
dealing with the free movement of capital under Art 56 EC Treaty (ex 73b). The
latest update of this list is the Court's Volkswagen decision of 23 October 2007 (Case
C-112/2005), which the Commission had launched against the Federal Republic of
Germany on 4 March 2005.2 This suit, brought under Art. 226 EC Treaty, had been
long coming. 3 That the Volkswagen statute, which effectively gave the Federal
government and the Land (federal state) of Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) a veto
against majority acquisition while only holding a fifth of all shares 4, would come
Peer Zumbansen, Osgoode Hall Law School. Associate Dean (Research, Graduate Studies and
Institutional Relations); Director, CLPE, www.comparativeresearch.net Co-Editor in Chief, German Law
Journal. Email: Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca; Daniel Saam, Ph.D. Candidate, Johann Wolfgang
Goethe-University, Frankfurt. Email: Saam@jur.uni-frankfurt.de. Thanks to the student editors of the
German Law Journal at Osgoode Hall Law School for research assistance and to CLPE Fellow, Kirsteen
Shields, Ph.D. Candidate at Queen Mary School of Law, University of London, UK, for helpful
comments and to my colleague Cynthia Williams and the participants in Osgoode Hall's Legal Theory
Seminar on 'Law and Economic Relations' for fruitful discussions.
1

http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/capital/framework/court

en.htm.

'Case C-112/2005, dated 23 October 2007, Connissionv. Federal Republic of Germany "Volkswagen".
3 See only the European Commission's Press Release of 13 October 2004, IP/04/1209: "The European

Commission has decided to take Germany to the European Court of Justice with respect to certain
provisions of a 1960 law privatising Volkswagen (VW law)...", available at:
http: / /europa.eu/rapid/]pressReleasesAction.do?reference= IP/04/1209&format=HTML&aged = 1&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited 27 October 2007).
4 See sections 2, 3 and 4 of the GESETZ UBER DIE UBERFUHRUNG DER ANTEILSRECHTE AN DER

[Law concerning the
transfer of shares in the VW limited liability company in private hands] of 21 July 1960, published in
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [Federal Gazette - BGB1.] 1960 I, 585, and BGB1. 1960 III, 641-1-1).

VOLKSWAGENWERK GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG IN PRIVATE HAND
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into the Commission's purview, could hardly surprise, given the Commission's
activity with regard to such 'golden share' provisions under Portuguese, French,
Belgian and English company laws. 5 The most recent decision of the ECJ in the case
of Volkswagen is of interest in more than one respect. Not only does it constitute a
continuation and further accentuation of a line of argument that the Court has been
unfolding over past few years with regard to the Member State provisions in
conflict with the EC's guarantee of the free movement of capital as laid down in
Art. 56 EC. The particular mentioning of the importance of the free movement of
capital in Art. 14 para. 2 EC for the realization of the internal market further
underlines the place of this guarantee within the larger political and economic
framework. After a longer period of relative marginalization in the struggle over
positive vs. negative integration 6, the increasing globalization of capital markets in
the last decade of the 20th century has moved the regulatory framework of capital to
the forefront of national and supranational policy makers. The extensive case law
by the ECJ, which the Commission lists on its Internal Market website7, forms only
one aspect of a larger-scale approach understood to improve the competitiveness of
the European economy. 8 Other elements of this policy initiative include rules
pertaining to 'company law and corporate governance, accounting and auditing.' 9
Here, in particular, the 'European Company Law scene', so masterfully depicted in
1973 by Clive Schmitthoff10 , has been in dramatic motion for the last couple of
years. The long-standing attempts at adopting a European Company Regulation

5 See, e.g., Johannes Adolff, Turn of the Tide? The 'Golden Share' Judgments of the European Courtof Justice
and the European Capital Markets, 3 GERMAN L.J. No. 8 (2002), available at:
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=170 at para. 9 (dealing with the ECJ's judgments of
4 June 2002 concerning the 'golden shares' under Belgian [C-503/99], Portuguese [C-367/ 98] and French
company law [C-483/99]); see subsequently the Court's ruling on golden share provisions under the
English company law, C-98/01, handed down on 13 May 2003, and Comission vs. Italy, C-174/04 as
well as Commission vs. The Netherlands, C-282/04 and C-283/04, 28 September 2006.
6 See Fritz W. Scharpf, BALANCING POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INTEGRATION. THE REGULATORY OPTIONS FOR
EUROPE. MPIFG WORKING PAPER 97/8. Cologne: Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies,

available at: http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp97-8/wp97-8.html,
7 See, supra, note 1.
8 See the Commission's website's announcement regarding the improvement of the 'regulatory
framework', in which European companies operate with a view to making them competitive 'in global
markets', available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/top layer/index 45 en.htm (last visited on
27 October 2007).

9 Id.
10 Clive

Schmitthoff, The Futureof the European Company Law Scene, in: IBID., THE HARMONISATION OF

EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW, 3 (1973).
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and Directive (Societas Europaea- SE) l l as well as a Take Over Directive finally came
to an end. The struggle over the statute for the SE lasted for three decades, twice the
time it should take for the passing of a EU directive governing corporate takeovers
in Europe, 12 an undertaking that itself had been brought underway in 1989.13 Both
attempts occupied a European administration working with many of its Member
States towards a 'level playing field' of companies in Europe. 14 While during the
1990s, one would have had the impression of European company law integration
losing its long-term momentum 5, this clearly changed in the context of the
continuing debates over a European Company and a European Take Over
Directive, both fuelled by increasingly denationalising investor activities and
pressures to adopt domestic regulatory frameworks to global demands for
improved corporate disclosure and investment opportunities. 16 Finally, with the
breakthrough at the 2000 Nice Summit for the SE statute, which subsequently got
adopted in 2001 and went into force in October 2004, on the one hand, and with the
17
all-exhausting passage of an eventually, much watered-down Takeover Directive
I

E. Werlauff, The SE Company - A New Connon European Company from 8 October 2004, 14 EUROPEAN
BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [EBLR] 85-103 (2003); Christoph Teichmann, The European Company - A Challenge
to Academics, Legislatures and Practitioners, in: 4 GERMAN L. J. 309 (2003), available at:
http://www.germanlawjoumal.com; Vanessa Edwards, The European Company - Essential Tool or
Eviscerated Dream ? 40 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 443-464 (2003); S. Ebert, The European Company on
the Level Playing Field of the Community, 14 EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [EBLR] 183-192 (2003); T. L.
Blackburn, The Societas Europea: The Evolving European Corporation Statute, 61 FORDH. L. REV. 695-772
(1993).
12

B. Pettet, Private versus Public Regulation in the field of Takeovers: The Future under the Directive,

BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [EBLR] 381-388 (2000); Klaus-Jfirgen Hopt, European Takeover
Regulation: Barriers to and Problems of Harmonizing Takeover Law in the European Community, in KlausJiirgen Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS. LAW AND PRACTICE (1992); Ronald J.
Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance
Environment, id.
EUROPEAN

13 Theo Raaijmakers, Takeover Regulation in Europe and America: The Need for Functional Convergence, in
Joseph A. McCahery/Piet Moerland/Theo Raaijmakers/Luc Renneborg (eds.), CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REGIMES. CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY (2002).
14See already Commissioner Karel von Miert's speech at the 1998 Davos World Economic Forum, "What

does a level playing field mean in the global economy?", available at
http: / / ec.europa.eu/ comm /competition/ speeches/text/sp1998 031 en.html (last visited 27 October
2007)
11Jan Wouters, European Company Law: Quo Vadis? 37 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 257-307 (2000).
16See, e.g., Matthias Casper, German capital market law - a permanent reform, 5 GERMAN L.J. 367 (2004), at
367, available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=412.

17 Silja Maul/Athanasios Kouloridas, The Takeover Bids Directive, 5 GERMAN L. J. 355-366 (2004), at
http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/pdf/.Vol05No04/PDF Vol 05 No 04 355366-PrivateMaulKouloridas.pdf.
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by the European Parliament in December 2003, on the other, this long persisting
stasis seemed to have come to an end. Moreover, the European Commission had
seized upon the widespread uneasiness with the state of affairs to install an expert
commission, whose first mandate had been to extrapolate the existing resistances
against a European takeover regime and to develop a model that would be likely to
satisfy the opponents. 18 With the group of experts', under the direction of Dutch
law professor, Jaap Winter, presenting the report shortly after, the Winter group
received a follow-up mandate, which might be seen as the starting point of a new
phase in European company lawmaking: the group launched a comprehensive
online consultation on an outline for a 'Modernized Company Law in Europe'-three
months after presenting the first report to the public. 19 The second report by the
High Level Group was made available after a careful analysis of the input from the
online consultation in November 2002.20 Soon after, in May 2003, the European
Commission issued its Communication to the Council and the European
Parliament: 'Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
21
European Union - A Plan to Move Forward' ('Action Plan').
In the two years since the Commission's Action Plan, the Commission has brought
on the way a number of initiatives that build on the detailed programme laid out in
2003.22 These initiatives are developed against the background of intense reform
debates in the various Member States, not only with regard to the apparently
inevitable move towards independent directors as mandated by the USA's 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 23 but also in light of increasing pressure on existing systems of
18J. Winter, 'Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues related to Takeover
Bids', (2002) at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01hlg-reporten.pdf.
1 See http:

/ / europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/ en/ company/company/ modem/index.htm.

" See J. Winter, 'Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern Regulatory
Framework
for
Company
Law
in
Europe',
(2002)
at
http:/ / europa.eu.int/ comm/ interna market/ en/ company/ company/ modern/ consult/ report en.pdf.
"' Available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003

0284en01.pdf.

22 For an updated overview, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal market/company/index

and http://europa.eu.int/comim/internal market/company /ecgforum/index

en.htm

en.htm.

J. N. Gordon, 'Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of SarbanesOxley', (2003) Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 416
(April), papers.ssrn.conm/sol3/papers.cfn ?abstract-id=391363 at http:/ / www.law.columbia.edu/center
program/law economics/wp listing 1/wp authorexclusive=filemgr.download&file id=69105&rtcont
entdisposition=filename%3DWP216.pdf; R. Thompson, 'Corporate Governance After Enron: The First
Year', (2003) Vanderbilt University Law School, Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 03-13,
papers.ssrn.coisol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=429622 at www.ssrn.com
21
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corporate management and industrial relations, in particular Germany's model of
co-determination. 24 Such activities, then, are being pursued in a complex regulatory
environment of domestic statutory law on the one hand, and of norms produced by
transnational regulatory bodies on the other. 25 One result of this
transnationalization of corporate law norm generation is that the negotiation of
regulatory approaches to questions of corporate control, ownership and - not least
- responsibility 26 - is taking place today under conditions that differ markedly from
traditional international law making. The emerging regulatory environment is at
once discursively open to experiences and proposals coming forth from norm
entrepreneurs that comprise both public, private and hybrid actors such as national
governments and courts, but also corporations, expert commissions, and
supranational standard setting organizations. 27 But it is also more accentuated with
regard to the degree to which legislative policies and domestic path dependencies
of political choices and historical, socio-economic developments, which shaped a
particular regulatory regime, are coming to the fore. As a result, the choices
available to law making bodies on the transnational level are not confined to
different models of 'harmonization' on the one hand and 'regulatory competition'
on the other. 28 Instead, the proliferation of norm entrepreneur contributes to a more
complex law-making environment, in which political choices are constantly
challenged by other considerations and models of market ordering, including
moral values and economic concepts. In addressing the regulatory challenge as to
which norms are most appropriate to the governance of the corporation in a
globally competitive setting, boundaries between company and capital markets law
become as relative as those between corporate governance, corporate social and
environmental responsibility, and industrial relations. To be sure, the transnational
24 See,

e.g., Theodor Baums, Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance:Inside a Law Making Process
of
a
very
new
nature,
(2001)
2
GERMAN
L.
J.
at:
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past-issues.php?id=43; Klaus-Jiirgen Hopt, Corporate Governance
in Germany, in Klaus-Jflrgen Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW
(2003); see also Jens Dammann, The Future of Codetermination after Centros: Will German Corporate Law
move closer to the U.S. Model? 8 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 607 (2003).
'5 See e.g. the overview of corporate governance codes in Europe, issued and constantly updated by the
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), at http://www.ecgi.org/.

26See Simon Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann, CorporateGovernance after Enron:An Age of Enlightenment,
in: AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE

AND
27

THE

US, 155 (Joseph McCahery & John Armour eds., 2006).

For an in-depth discussion of this regulatory environment, see GRALF-Peter Calliess/Peer Zumbansen,

ROUGH CONSENSUS, RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAWforthcorning.

" Peer Zumbansen, Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory Competition in European
Company Law, 12 EUR. L. J. 534 (2006); Peer Zumbansen, The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and
Labor Law, 13 IND. J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 261 (2006).
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reality of norm creation challenges the role and competence of traditional lawmakers as they enter a de-nationalizing market of norms and ideas. By way of
illustration, that the European legislator should concern itself with issues as
precarious and contested as executive compensation, 29 while the Court of Justice
30
marches on with increasing pressure on Member States' rules on company seats,
are clear signs of an ever-faster diversifying agenda for Brussels' European
company law programme, which can be properly understood only in relation to the
transnational discursive and regulatory environment just described.
This background sheds a particular light on the recent series of 'golden shares'
decisions handed down by the ECJ. The most recent, Volkswagen decision goes to
the heart of the ongoing reform policies of European company law, while
powerfully touching on the long-standing debate over converging corporate
governance standards. While there is an important body of literature underlining
the relevance of historical trajectories and associated competitive advantages to
national differences (the so-called Varieties of Capitalism school31 ), there is wide
agreement that these distinct national systems are under severe and growing
pressure to converge. 32 The privatization of public welfare systems and the
g3
increased tendency to base pension and retirement financing on the capital market
See the Commission Recommendation of 14 December 2004, available at:
http: / / europa.eu.int/ comm/internal market/ company/ directors-remun/index en.htm.
21

30 Kilian Bilz/Theresa Baldwin, The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): the European Court of Justice

Decision in Ueberseeringof 5 November 2002 and its !mpact on German and European Company Law, in: No.12
3 GERMAN L. J., available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current issue.php?id=214; C.
Kersting/C. C. Schindler, The ECJ's Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its Effects on Practice,
(2003) 4 GERMAN L. J. 1277-1291; Walter Bayer, Die EuGH-EntscheidungInspire Art und die deutsche GmbH
im Wettbewerb der europdischen Rechtsordnungen, BETRIEBSBERATER 2357-2366 (2003).
A. Hall/David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in: Varieties of Capitalism. The
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 1 (Hall/Soskice Ed. 2001); David Soskice, Divergent
Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980's and 1990's, in: Continuity
and Change in Contemporary Capitalism 101 (Kitschelt/Lange/Marks/Stephens Ed. 1999); Ronald
Dore/William Lazonick/Mary O'Sullivan, Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century, 15 OXFORD
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY (OXFORD REV. ECON. POLY) 102 (1999); Robert Boyer, Coherence, Diversity,
and the Evolution of Capitalismns - The Institutional Conplementarity Hypothesis, 2 EVOL. INST. ECON. REV. 43
(2005), 45-47; see also Matthew Allen, The varieties of capitalism paradigm: not enough variety?, 2 SOCIOECONOMIC REVIEW 87 (2004).
31 Peter

32See, e.g. Eddy Wymeersch, Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western

Europe?, in: Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity 230 (Joseph McCahery/Piet
Moerland/Theo Raaijmakers/Luc Rennebog eds., 2002); Peer Zumbansen, European CorporateLaw and
National Divergences: The Case of Takeover Law, 3 WASH U GLOB STUD L. REV. 867 (2004); MATHIAS SIEMS,
DIE KONVERGENZ DER RECHTSSYSTEME IM RECHT DER AKTIONARE (2006).
31Friedrich Kfibler, The Imnpact of Equity Markets on Business Organization:Some Comparative Observations
Regarding Differences in the Evolution of Corporate Structures, 2 EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW
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have coincided with a worldwide competition for stock market investments. 34 As a
consequence, traditional stakeholder-oriented systems of corporate governance are
increasingly challenged as to their capacity to provide the transparency and
management control necessary for their success in the global competition for
35
investments.
The Volkswagen decision brings these conditions into sharper focus yet. As was to
be expected, the Court found it comparatively easy to identify the Volkswagen
provisions to be in violation with the Treaty's free movement of capital guarantees.
A closer look at the Court's reasoning as well as at the context in which this case
has been decided sheds light on the dynamics between creating a European
competitive business environment on the one hand and doing justice to the political
choices at the Member State level on the other. One week after the ECJ's decision,
Lower Saxony's premier announced that his government planned a revision of the
Volkswagen statute that would accommodate the Court's ruling while respecting
the historical 'compromise' of 1959.36 This compromise had resulted in giving the
capital owners, the Unions and the government a representative and co-deciding
stake in Volkswagen with the effect of 'protecting' the company from domination
through one shareholder. 37 Considering the prominence of the theme of codetermination within the global debate over the convergence or divergence of
corporate governance standards 38, the Volkswagen case offers a dramatic
perspective on the regulatory multilevel dynamics of contemporary corporate law
making. It opens - for a final encore? - the curtain for the Rhenish model of
REVIEW [EBOR] 669 (2001); Friedrich Kfibler, The Rules of Capital Under Pressure of the Securities Markets,
in: Capital Markets and Company Law 95 (Hopt/Wymeersch Ed. 2003).
14 Theodor

Baums, Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance:Inside a Law Making Process of a very
new nature, 2 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past issues.php?id=43
(2001); Theodor Baums, Company Law Reform in Germany, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 181 (2003).
35 Henry Hansmann/Reinier Kraakman, Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law?, in: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

REGIMES.

CONVERGENCE

AND

DIVERSITY

56

(McCahery/Moerland/Raaijmakers/Renneborg eds. 2002).
36" VW. Gesetz soll wiederbelebtwerden", FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE SONNTAGSZEITUNG (online edition), 27

October 2007, available at:
http://www.faz.net/s/RubD16ElF55D21144C4AE3F9DDF52B6ElD9/Doc-E238C927CCDBC4EED9C7
9CEE5DD0506CD-ATpl-Ecommon-Scontent.html (last visited 28 October 2007).
37 See ECJ, Case C-112/2005,

dated 23 October 2007, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany
"Volkswagen", paragraph 22; see also, infra, sub B I.

38For references, see Jens Dammann, The Futureof Codeterminationafter Centros: Will German Corporate

Law move closer to the U.S. Model? 8 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 607 (2003)
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capitalism, behind which government, corporations and unions are understood as
partners in a market ordering exercise. 39 The political-social compromise, which has
marked the German post-war economic order during the Bonn Republic has been
under quite some strain with the deepening process of European integration and
the exposure of national markets to global competition. 40 As a result, past national
political trajectories have not necessarily been found to provide a clear guide
towards future developments - instead, as documented by the diversification and
proceduralization of supra-national law-making in the areas of social policy,
employment and now corporate law 4' - they have become contested variables in a
search of best practices. The Volkswagen decision must be seen as a crucial
contribution to this search.

B. The Holding and Context of the Volkswagen Decision of 23 October 2007
The Volkswagen Decision of 23 October 2007, instantly emphasized as a milestone
in Europe's development of an open market 42, was announced five and a half years
after the ECJ had delivered the initial three judgements on the compliance of
national golden share agreements with the free movement of capital under Art. 56
EC.43 Some of Europe's most visible symbols of economic protectionism had
effectively been targeted by the Commission and by the Court.44 In order, however,

39See only Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre Capitalisme (1991).
40

Friedrich Kilbler, The Impact of Equity Markets on Business Organization:Some ComparativeObservations

Regarding Differences in the Evolution of CorporateStructures, 2 EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
REVIEW [EBOR] 669 (2001)

LAW

41Catherine Barnard/Simon Deakin, In search of coherence: social policy, the single market andfundamental

rights, 31 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, 331-345 (2000); Catherine Barnard/Simon Deakin, 'Negative'
and 'positive' harmonisationof labor law in the European Union, 8 COLUM. J. FUR. L., 389 (2002); David
Trubek/Louise Trubek, Hard and Soft Lazo in the Construction of Social Europe: The Open Method of
Cooperation, 11 FUR.L.J.343 (2005); Colin Scott, Nea-ish Governance in the EU and the Legitimacy of th EU,
CLPE RESEARCH PAPER 17/ 2007, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=1003824
42See Landler, At Volkswagen, a historic change at hand, HERALD TRIBUNE (online edition), 22 October 2007;

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard refers to the ECJ ruling as a "big breakthrough for the EU single market" in:
Porsche poised to buy VW,THE TELEGRAPH (online edition), 24 October 2007.
43See, supra, note 5.
44Landler, Porsche to raise stake after court strikes down 'Volkswagen Law', HERALD TRIBUNE (online edition),

23 October 2007; the relevance of the ECJ's golden share judgments for the Volkswagen Law had already
been pointed out by Hartmut Krause in the year 2002, see Hartmut Krause, Von "goldenen Aktien" dem
VW-Gesetz und der Cbernahmerichtlinie, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2747 (2002).
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to better assess the possible consequences of this newest development, an in-depth
analysis of the reasoning of the Volkswagen Decision is necessary.
I.The Court's Reasoning
The European Commission filed an action under Art. 226 EC against the Federal
Republic of Germany on 4 March 2005.45 The Volkswagen statute contained three
provisions that the Court found to be in violation of the EC Treaty provision on the
free movement of capital. First, section 2 (1)46 of the Volkswagen Statute caps the
voting rights each single shareholder can exercise to 20 percent of the company's
overall voting rights, secondly, paragraph 4 (3)47 provides that the quorum that is
needed for an approval of a management resolution is - other than the statutorily
needed quorum of 75 percent - increased to 80 percent. Finally, paragraph 4 (1)48
grants the Federal State and the Land of Niedersachsen the right to appoint two
members of Volkswagen's supervisory board on condition that they are
shareholder in the company.
Before assessing each of these provisions in detail, the ECJ addressed the German
submissions to the proceedings. In effect, the German government had argued that
the Volkswagen statute ought not be regarded as a 'national measure', since it had
arguably emerged from a contract between individuals and groups, which had during the post-war years - claimed rights in respect of the then ownerless
Volkswagen company. 49 In transposing this very agreement into a statute, the
German state had merely exercised its formal legislative power without passing a
substantive legislative act.50
4, See

the Conmtission Application for Case C-112/05
http://www.curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en.

of

4

March

2005,

available

at:

Paragraph 2 (1) of the Volkswagen statute provides: "The voting rights of a shareholder whose par
value shares represent more than one fifth of the share capital shall be limited to the number of votes
granted by the par value of shares equivalent to one fifth of the share capital."
46

47Paragraph 4 (3) of the Volkswagen statute provides: "Resolutions of the general meeting which, under

the Law on public limited companies, require the favorable vote of at least three quarters of the share
capital represented at the time of their adoption, shall require the favorable vote of more than four fifths
of the share capital represented at the time of that adoption."
Paragraph 4 (1) of the Volkswagen statute provides: "The Federal Republic of Germany and the Land
of Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen) may each point two members of the supervisory board on condition
that they hold shares inthe company."

48

49See: Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, delivered on 13 February 2007, Case C112/05, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany "Volkswagen", paragraphs 25 -26.
50See, supra,note 49, paragraph 45.
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The ECJ took issue with this contention and found the adoption of the Volkswagen
statute "a manifestation par excellence of state authority." 51 It held that since the
contested provisions were based on an act of the German legislation and that the
German legislator alone was entitled to modify or rescind the Volkswagen statute,
the statute could not be regarded as a private law agreement but constituted a
national measure.
At first glance, this scrutiny might seem to be of lesser importance when compared
to the voting restrictions and their alleged infringement of Art. 56 EC. The historical
events that gave rise to Germany's argument concerning the 'national measure',
however, lend the dispute a highly symbolic dimension. In 1959, an agreement
between the workers and trade unions of Volkswagen on the one hand and the
Federal State and the state of Lower Saxony on the other concluded an ongoing
dispute about the ownership of the then legally ownerless but flourishing
Volkswagen undertaking. This dispute arose in the aftermath of WW II due to a set
of unique circumstances, characterized not only by the remarkable dynamics of
Volkswagen's post-War economic success but also by the firm's specific
stakeholder constellation. After WW II, the Volkswagen factory, promptly
recommenced operations in 1945. As it was located in the British occupied zone, the
British military government temporarily assumed the decisive power to determine
the fate of the factory. When the British withdrew from the occupied zone having
failed in their attempts to sell the company to one of its competitors, Volkswagen
52
became virtually ownerless.
Notwithstanding, the 'ownerless' Volkswagen factory, flourished as a business
during the end of the 1940s and the 1950s. During the 1950s several claims with
regard to the ownership of the company were asserted. Amongst those claiming
ownership were those who had, on a weekly basis, contributed payments to
facilitate the erection of the plant during the 1930s. Such efforts were expected to
culminate in the opportunity to purchase one of the VW cars, the so-called Kraft
durch Freude- Wagen ('strength through happiness' car). 53 Therefore after the British
had ceded responsibility for the company, the company's employees, the unions as
well as the Federal state and the Land of Lower Saxony put forward their
ownership claims. 54 This dispute and a number of related court procedures
51 See,

supra,note 37, paragraph 27.

52See, supra, note 49, paragraph 24.

51The former name Volkswagen (people's car) was dismissed by Hitler in 1939, see, supra, note 49,
paragraph 20.
54See, supra, note 49, paragraph 25.
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concerning the ownership eventually contributed to a destabilization of the
company. With VW having been a powerful symbol of German productivity and
the country's innovative capacities, the five parties agreed on a compromise that
took the form of a multilateral contract. Under this contract, the employees and
trade unions agreed to abandon their alleged rights in VW if the State were to
guarantee their protection against any single controlling shareholder. 55 The
56
provisions contained in this agreement later formed the Volkswagen statute.
The Court had to address several aspects of the Volkswagen statute. Yet, given the
particular context of converging corporate governance regimes in Europe against
the background of a worldwide search for better corporate governance principles,
the Court's reluctance of engaging at a deeper level with this particular set of
circumstances during its assessment of the first contested provision of the statute, is
remarkable. It would have been appropriate to emphasize the particular historical
circumstances that gave rise to the contested contract.
1. Restrictions of the free movement of capital
The European Commission had filed the action against the German state claiming
that the relevant provisions of the Volkswagen statute infringed both the free
movement of capital (Art. 56 EC) and the freedom of establishment (Art. 43 EC).
The ECJ scrutinized whether the provisions of the Volkswagen statute complied
with the EC's fundamental freedom of free movement of capital. Therefore the ECJ
first emphasized that the legal frame that had enabled the state to exercise a
considerable influence on the company's governance, had been developed by the
provision in Section 4 (3), which allowed the public sector - in fact the Land of
Lower Saxony 57 - to preserve a comfortable blocking minority with regard to major
decisions of the company's management. Secondly, this degree of influence would
be supplemented by Section 2 (1), which capped the voting rights for every
shareholder at 20 percent. 58 Since the two provisions taken together could at least
potentially deter direct investors from other Member States the Court recognized a
restriction of the freedom under Art. 56 paragraph 1 EC. 59

55See, supra,note 37, paragraph 22 and 23.
56

For a historical overview of the Volkswagen law, see, supra, note 49, paragraph 17 to 29.

17 The

German Federal State has sold its shares and is, therefore, no shareholder of the Volkswagen plc
anymore.

58

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 51.

59See, supra,note 37, paragraph 56.
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With regard to Section 4 (1) of the Volkswagen statute, the Court found that the
right of the Federal State and Lower Saxony to appoint two representatives to the
supervisory board (Entsenderecht)infringed the free movement of capital. The Court
found the provision to be granting the authorities a level of influence
disproportionate to their actual investments. Section 4 (1) of the Volkswagen statute
would therefore constrain the other shareholders' possibilities both to effectively
participate in the management of the company. Consequently, it would also be
liable to deter direct investors from other Member States from investing in the
60
company's capital.
2. Justification of the restrictions
Finally, the ECJ rejected Germany's submission according to which the contested
provisions of the Volkswagen statute are at least justified by "overriding reasons in
the general interest". Those would - due to its history - be included in the law itself
and could be expressed as "equitable balance of powers" .61
In accordance with its settled case law 62 the ECJ scrutinized whether a restriction of
a fundamental freedom could be justified under the EC. Some, however narrow,
justifications could arise within the context of certain domestic tax issues or of
public security as stated in Art. 58 EC. 63 Outside of these justifications not
applicable in this case, a non-discriminatory restriction could be justified by
overriding reasons in the general interest. 64 Accordingly, each Member State is

60 See,

supra,note 37, paragraph 66.

6' See, supra, note 37, paragraph 70; the argument of the German state refers to the origin of the
Volkswagen statute as an agreement between the then participating economic actors, see above, supra,
note 49.
62 E.g. ECJ, Case C-483/99 of 4 June 2002, Commission v. French Republic "Soiete Nationale Elf Aquitaine"

paragraph 45; ECJ, Case C-463/00 of 13 May 2003, Coninnssion v. Kingdon of Spain, paragraph 68.
6, Art. 58 (1) of the EC provides: "The provisions of Article 56 shall be without prejudice to the right of
Member States: (a) to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between taxpayers
who are not in the same situation with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the place
where their capital is invested; (b) to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law
and regulations, in particular in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial
institutions, or to lay down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for purposes of
administrative or statistical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public
policy or public security".
64 ECJ, Case C-483/99 of 4 June 2002, Commission v. French Republic "Soiete Nationale Elf Aquitaine",

paragraph 45; ECJ, Case C-463/00 of 13 May 2003, Commission v. Kingdom of Spain, paragraph 68.;
According to ECJ, Case C-98/01 of 13 May 2003, Connission v. United Kingdonz of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, paragraph 49 and ECJ, C-282/04 of 28 September 2006, Commission v. Kingdom of the
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generally entitled to define the standard of protection for the general interest. This
entitlement is, however, limited again by the Treaty and, in particular by the
principle of proportionality. In order to comply with the latter, the "measures
adopted (must) be appropriate to secure the attainment" of the pursued objective
and go not beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.65
The ECJ held that Germany had failed to provide sufficient justification for the
voting restrictions. It rejected Germany's contention that the voting restrictions
served the protection of interests of employees and of minority shareholders. While
the Court recognized with regard to the latter, that the "desire to provide protection
for such shareholders may also constitute a legitimate interest" 66, it did not find the
concrete voting restrictions to be conducive to that end. Remarkable is the Court's
use of the word "also" in the given context, as this can only be read as an implicit
reference to the employees' interests, mentioned just before.
Another statement in the Court's opinion seems in odd contrast to its careful, if not
reluctant engagement with the issue of protected interests in the remainder of the
opinion. When the ECJ found that the German government had failed to explain
how the contested provisions of the Volkswagen statute are appropriate and
necessary to preserve the jobs generated by Volkswagen activity 67, this can in fact
be understood as another reference to the arguments raised in conjunction with the
restrictions protecting a legitimate interest. While this line of interpretation may
already border on speculation, the concrete wording of the here referred-to
passages suggests that the Court was not entirely blind to the basis of the
contentions made by the German government. Compared to the formal argument
with which the Court found the VW statute to be a "national measure" 68, its
reasoning with regard to the voting restrictions does signal the Court's awareness
of the particularity of the arguments brought by the German government.

Netherlands, paragraph 35, each Member State, whose provisions are subject to a procedure according to
Art. 226 EC is obliged to submit factual circumstances that the respective restrictions are justified by
overriding requirements of general interest.
65See, sipra,note 37, paragraph 73.
66See,

supra,note 37, paragraph 77.

67See, supra,note 37, paragraph 80.
61See, sjpra, note 37, paragraph 26 to 29.
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II. Preparationof the Decision by Advocate GeneralRuiz-Jarabo Colomer's Opinion
For observers, the Court's ruling could hardly have come as a total surprise.
Looking at the carefully phrased Opinion by Advocate General (AG) Colomer of 13
February 2007, the general outline of the case had become visible already some time
ago. Remarkably, the same AG had already authored the Opinions for previous
actions against domestic golden share arrangements in other European Member
States. 69 As with many other cases, however, here too we find a certain discrepancy
between the scope of issues addressed by the AG and those subsequently taken up
by the Court.
1. Infringement of Art. 56
With regard to the alleged infringement of Art. 56 EC, the ECJ basically followed
the Opinion delivered by AG Colomer. 70 The AG had argued that the provisions of
the Volkswagen Law constituted non-discriminatory restrictions, which objectively
favoured the public authorities. "Those protectionist consequences", he reasoned,
lead to a "dissuasive effect" of the Volkswagen statute to investors from other
Member States, constituting - in accordance with the ECJ's settled case law - a
violation of the free movement of capital.7' Since neither the protection of the
employees' interests nor the protection of the minority shareholders was sufficient
to constitute a general interest, the restrictions could not be justified. 72
2. The ambivalent relevance of Art. 295 EC in the Volkswagen decision
As alluded to before, the Opinion of the AG contains remarkable considerations
concerning Art. 295 EC. The Court, however, chose not to address these in its
judgment at all. According to Art. 295 EC, "this Treaty [the EC] shall in no way
prejudice the rules in Member State's governing the system of property
ownership". In contrast to his earlier Opinions 73, AG Colomer rejected the
applicability of Art. 295 EC in the context of the Volkswagen statute. 74
61See the opinions delivered in the initial judgements on national golden share arrangements, see: ECJ,
Case C-367/98, Comnmission v. Portugal; ECJ, Case C-483/99, See, supra, note 64; ECJ Case C-503/99,
Commission v. Belgium.
70See, supra, note 49.
71See, supra,note 49, paragraph 89.

72See, supra,note 49, paragraph 103.
71See, supra, note 64.
74See, supra,note 49, paragraph 47 through 56.
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He quite remarkably qualified it to be "curious" that the German government had
not referred to Art. 295 EC. 75 This statement, presumably, derives from his formerly
expressed views about the role of Art. 295 EC. In his Opinion, Art. 295 EC would
entitle Member States, when privatizing formerly state-owned undertakings, to
76
maintain extraordinary company rights by imposing golden share arrangements.
The AG opined that if a Member State were free to decide whether an undertaking
is either being thoroughly privatized or socialized, Art. 295 EC must a fortiori offer
the possibility to partly privatize while enacting golden share arrangements (as a
kind of "minus" to the complete privatization). 77 According to this argument,
golden share arrangements would have to be subsumed under the term "rules in
Member State's governing the system of property ownership" (Art. 295 EC) and,
therefore, would fall outside of the purview of the EC Treaty.
Yet, the omitted references to Art. 295 EC are not curious at all if one considers that
the ECJ had constantly rejected the applicability of Art. 295 EC in similar cases. In
the Klaus Konle decision of 1997, the ECJ had briefly stated that Art. 295 EC did not
have the effect of exempting a domestic system of property from the fundamental
rules (which include the fundamental freedoms) of the Treaty. 78 In other words, as
long as a domestic statute infringed a fundamental freedom, the Member State
should not be able to defend its golden share arrangements by mere reference to
79
Art. 295 EC.
The Volkswagen Opinion of the AG shows a drastic change of his former
interpretation of Art. 295 EC. In his Opinion on the Volkswagen case, the AG
dismissed the applicability of Art. 295 EC, as he found the present case to exhibit
"substantial differences in relation to the cases, which the court has determined to
date". 80 The former judgements arose in the context of privatized undertakings.
Central to those rulings had been measures, which "constituted means by which
the public authorities could participate in certain activities of vital importance to
the national economy, with the purpose of imposing an economic policy

7'See, supra, note 49, paragraph 47.
76See

Stefan Grundmann/Florian Mt6slemn, Die Goldene Aktie,

ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 319,

(2003), 2003, at 339.
77See

Stefan Grundmann/Florian Mt6slemn, Die Goldene Aktie,

ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 319,

(2003), at 339.
7 ECJ, Case C-302/97, Klaus Konle v. Republic of Austria, paragraph 38.
71See also ECJ, Case C- 483/99, supra, note 62, paragraph 44.

80See, supra,note 49, paragraph 50 and 51.
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strategy". 81 However, in the AG's view, the Volkswagen statute did not fall into
this category, since it would concern neither one of the country's key branches nor
a system of property ownership.8 2 Conclusively, the AG's formerly broad
applicability of Art. 295 EC now seems reduced to domestic "key branches". But,
since it remains entirely uncertain how those are to be identified in the first place 3,
the AG's interpretation of Art. 295 EC forfeits practicability.
III. Compatibilityof the Volkswagen decision with previous 'golden share' judgments
As seen, the ECJ stuck with its previous judgements on golden share agreements.
The definition of the term 'free movement of capital' is still informed by the
nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1998. It,
however, remains questionable whether a Directive can provide definition for
terms of the Treaty itself. In order not to render the free movement of capital
illusory 4, no domestic instrument may be created if that instrument may be liable
to actually or potentially impede foreign direct investors from acquiring a stake in
the capital in order to participate in its management or in its control. In this
reading, Art. 56 EC was a "general prohibition on restrictions on the movement of
capital", which "goes beyond the mere elimination of unequal treatment on
grounds of nationality".85 The Volkswagen decision, thus, builds nicely onto the
string of cases, in which the Court has been executing a gradual shift from striking
down discriminatory arrangements to the erection of parameters obliging member
states to provide - within a specific proportionality test - justifications for
arrangements seen as likely impediments for transnational commerce.8 6 With the
Volkswagen decision, as with the golden share decisions before it, but also the

81 See,

supra,note 49, paragraph 50.

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 51; Opinion in Cases C-367/98, C-483/99, C-503/99, s1pra, note 80,
paragraph 62.
82

This is subject to ongoing political discussions throughout Europe, for instance, see Dietmar
Hawranek/Christian Reiermann, Gutes Geld, bbses Geld, DER SPIEGEL 27/2007, p. 84, 85; see also Daniel
Saam, Protection for domestic core enterprises against direct investments by fimeign-owned investment funds, 1
LEGAL LATITUDES: NEWSLETTER FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS AND LAW COMMUNITY 57 (2007),
available
at:
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/legallatitudes/documents/Legal Latitudes Vol 01
No 04.pdf (last visited 28 October 2007).
83

84

ECJ, Case C-112/05, s1pra, note 2, paragraph 54 and 55; ECJ, Case C-483/99, supra, note 62, paragraph
41; ECJ, Case C-367/98, supra, note 69, paragraph 45.
8

,E.g. ECJ Case C-367/98, supra, note 69, paragraph 45.

86 Adolff, supra, note 5,sub paragraph 2.
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other highly prominent company law cases in Centros87, Ueberseering88 and Inspire
Art89 , the Court has continues to effectively strike into the lingering negotiations,
contestations, deadlocks and entrenchments in Europe with regard to corporate
mobility, the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. The
institutional, law-making role of the Court within this multi-level regulatory
scenario is as fascinating as is the set of substantive issues at stake. Thus, the
Volkswagen decision constitutes another formidably challenging contribution to
the already complex development of European corporate law. It is this combination
of the interplay between the Commission's attempts at moving European company
law forward with the different strategies of the member states to resist or to adopt
to the 'pressure to reform' in light of globalizing capital markets on the one hand
with the unique place held by the ECJ in this law-making laboratory on the other
that makes the field a prime subject for the study of transnational law-making.

C. The Volkswagen Decision in Context
It would be no exaggeration to state that an assessment of what characterized
European company law, would differ wildly if not from year to year than surely
when comparing a several-year stretch of time with another. The regulatory agenda
of the Commission, not least evidenced by the sheer omnipresence of Internal
Market Commissioner, Charlie McCreevy 90 , has been in a constant state of growth,
refinement and differentiation. Any assessment, then, will be one of a process
rather than of a reached endpoint. It is important to keep the mixed nature of
European company law making in mind, when beginning to speculate about the
87 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erlivervs-Org., 1999 O.J. (C 136) 3; see E. Wymeersch, Centros: A

Landmark Decision in European Company Law, in T. Baums,K. J. Hopt and N. Horn (eds.), CORPORATIONS,
CAPITAL MARKETS AND BUSINESS IN THE LAW. LIBER AMICORUM RICHARD M. BUXBAUM (2000); W. F. Ebke,
Centros - Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 AM.J. COMP. L. 623 (2000); see also Harald Halbhuber,
National DoctrinalStructures and European Company Law, 38 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1385-1420
(2001)
88Case C-208/00, UeberseeringBV v. NCC Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH, ECR 2000,

1-9919; see hereto Kilian B5lz & Teresa Baldwin, The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztlieorie): The European
Court of Justice Decision in Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and its Impact on German and European Company
Law, in 3 GERMAN L.J. No.12 (2002), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current
issue.php?id=214; W.-H. Roth, 'From Centros to Ueberseering: Free Movement of Companies, Private
InternationalLaw, and Community Law', 52 ICLQ 177-208 (2003)
89Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabriken voor Amsterdam v. InspireArt Ltd., 2003 O.J. (C 275) 10;
see Kersting & Schindler, The ECJ's Inspire Art Decision of 30 September and Its Effects on Practice,in 4
GERMAN L.J., 1277-91 (2003), available at http://www.germanlawjoumal.com /article.phpid=344;
90 http://ec.europa.eu/conission-barroso/mccreevy/index-en.htm
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impact of this recent, prominent judgment. Thus, trying to bear in mind the
diversity of historically grown, socio-economic structures that gave rise to different
company law regimes in the various member states, when evaluating a new
company law judgment from the Court, is a necessary precondition to make sense
of it, but is it sufficient? The level of activity of the Court must be seen in
comparison and correlation with that which we can observe in Brussels. With an
eye to the Court on the one hand, and another one on fast-evolving processes of
'company law reform' in member states all throughout the EU, the Commission has
been a fast learner and adaptive facilitator of regulatory learning. The Commission
has proven to be an initiator and apt consumer of company law related expertise
needed to better understand the challenges to reform of a market finding itself
enlarging at a dramatic pace, with the combined challenge to inspect existing and
evolving regimes with a view to the West and to the East.
The Volkswagen Decision, then, was not a decision coming out of nowhere, nor
would anybody suspect it to have little practical impact. Yet, the evaluation of the
decision's impact poses a considerable number of challenges, given the complexity
of the field described above. In the interest of narrowing our first attempts at an
analysis, it is certainly fair to say that the decision was handed down in a context of
legal and socio-economic contestation of the way that corporate boards are to be
staffed, controlled and that corporate power is being exercised. The mere
mentioning of the company's name brought to the forefront of any debate about
Volkswagen's future in the European and global market its famous, if much
contested model of worker involvement, itself connected with the company's
intriguing historical origins. It was in fact through the eyes of the many journalists,
predominantly in Europe and in North-America, who instantly commented on the
Court's ruling, that we have been beginning to discern the dimensions of the
current form of Andrew Shonfield's "Modern Capitalism" 91 and its possibly
forming future trajectories. The state of nervousness that characterizes many
observations of the present development is a mere reflection on the complexity we
are facing when discussing forces of change, of convergence and divergence.
Once we begin, however, to look beyond the prominent place occupied by the
questions concerning Volkswagen's co-determination in order to resituate these
concerns within a larger framework of considerations about corporate governance
and the mixed, public and private nature of the norms constituting that regime,
comprised of hard and soft law, of direct and increasingly powerful, indirect forms
of regulation, we are able to appreciate the unavoidably political nature of the

91 ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM. THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER

(1965)
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current discussions about corporate governance. Looking at but also beyond codetermination forces us to take a closer look at the supporting regulatory and socioeconomic frameworks in which co-determination but also corporate governance
elements such as board structure, compensation, power allocation and shareholder
structures are presently being reconfigured. Looking beyond co-determination as
such, then, allows us to understand it as one element in a larger field of interrelated
institutions that find themselves in dramatic change. It is for that reason, that, yes,
the Volkswagen decision underlines the already long-held suspicion that corporate
law is deeply political, but that there is, at the same time, more than that. It is
important, but not sufficient to reread Berle's "Twentieth Century Capitalist
Revolution" 92 to understand the present forces at work in a transnational arena of
public and private actors contesting and constantly redrawing the 'boundaries of
the firm'. It is important to read Karl Polanyi 93 today, but it is important to read it in
the present context, which is marked by significant advances in the theory of
institutional economics 94, by a fast evolving expertise in the 'varieties of
97
96
capitalism' 95 and theories of 'embeddedness' and comparative corporate law. It
92

ADOLPH A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954); see also Berle's
assessment of Shonfield, 82 POL. SC. Q. 628 (1967), where Berle attests Shonfield to have written "the first
serious and scholarly review of the modern capitalist revolution", which he [Berle] places in a fruitful
and complementing dialogue with Galbraith's THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE, finding that both authors
concur in their assessment of the need to expand public control over private enterprise, recognizing that
economic goals are diminishing in relative importance, gradually giving way to expertise-based,
scientific considerations of societal development. Thanks to Osgoode Hall Ph.D. candidate, Fenner
Kennedy-Stewart, for having pointed us to this review.
9

,KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944)

94

DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1991);
Paul A. David, Wiy are institutions the 'carriersof history'?:Path dependence and the evolution of conventions,
organizationsand institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS 205-220 (1994); Daniel
Kiwit & Stefan Voigt, Uberlegungen zurn institutionellenWandel unter Beriicksichtigung des Verhfiltnisses
interner und externer lnstitutionen, 46 ORDO 117-148 (1995)

95See, e.g. John W. Cioffi, Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics and the foundations of Finance
Capitalism in the United States and Germany, 7 GERMAN L. J. 533 (2006), available at:
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.phpid=732.
96

See only Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 481 (1985), and Mark Granovetter, The Impact of Social Structure on

Economic Outcones, 19 J. Econ. Persp. 33 (2005); see the ciritique by Jens Beckert, The Great Transfornation
of Embeddedness. Karl Polanyiand the New Economic Sociology, Max-PLANCK-INSTITUT FUR
GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG/ MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES, MPIFG DISCUSSION
PAPER 07/1 (2007), available at: http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg-dp/dp07-1.pdf
97Klaus

J.Hopt, ComparativeCompany Lazo, in: OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1161-1191
(Mathias Reimann/Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006), available at:
http://www.ecgi.org/wp/wp-id.php?id=231; see earlier Mark J.Roe, Comparative Corporate
Governance, in: THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF LAW & ECONOMICS (Peter Newman ed., 1998)

1046

GERMAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 08 No. 11

is against this background that contemporary assessments of corporate law have to
be complemented by an analysis of the regulatory environment of companies on
the one hand and their internal differentiation and ongoing experimentation as
risk-taking, profit-seeking, researching and developing organizations on the
other.98 It is only through the combination of these two perspectives that we take
the lessons of earlier, astute observers of the company seriously today.
Thus, drawing out the explicit and implicit aspects of the Volkswagen decision of
23 October 2007, can we understand it as part of a laboratory of contemporary
corporate law making in progress. As journalists worldwide were fast to identify
the central aspects and consequences of the ECJ's ruling 99, we began to be alerted to
what many believe was at stake in this case. In light of the long-standing emphasis
on Germany's Rhenish capitalist company and industrial relations regime, the case
was seen to strike at the heart of German corporate governance 00, as it targeted one
of Europe's foremost model companies of worker codetermination. When,
however, a leading German newspaper pointed to that very fact while at the same
time highlighting that this model did show - "often in disgusting manner"- the
excesses of this regime'0 1, the degree of contestation marking this field, onto which
the Court found itself treading (or, rushing?), eventually began to emerge. Two
aspects, in particular, make this case remarkable. For one, its concrete
circumstances belie the general intention of this and the previous rulings intended
not only against capital market barriers, but also in favor of opening up domestic
markets for foreign investment. In the case of Volkswagen, the expected outcome of
the ECJ's intervention into the Wolfsburg Comfort Zone is a cleared path for
family-held Porsche to succeed in its longstanding attempt at acquiring a majority
of Volkswagen. 10 2 This is particularly poignant as the Volkswagen ruling comes, as
91Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation:Origins,Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 1537 (1981);
William Lazonick, Innovative Enterpriseand Historical Transfornation,3 ENTERPRISE & SOCIETY 3 (2002)
91See, e.g., EU court strikes down 'VW lav', THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, 23 October 2007, MSNBC.com (online
edition): "The decision is expected to have ramifications across Europe, where many governments have
tried to protect companies they see as vital to their economies from takeovers, particularly foreign ones";
David Gow, Loss of Germany's VW lawe spells end of the roadfor golden siares, THE GUARDIAN, 24 October
2007 (online edition): "The judgment [...] sends a warning to protectionist governments keen to shield
so-called strategic companies from 'foreign', often European, takeovers".
110Sean O'Grady, Porsche acceleratestakeover plan as 'VI

Law' rejected, THE INDEPENDENT, 25 October 2007
(online edition): "A piece of German industrial tradition was consigned to the scrapheap yesterday by
the European Court of Justice".
101Georg Meck, Der Porsche-Clanrfistetffir die Zeit nach den VW-Gesetz, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, 22 October 2007 (online edition).

10 Parmy Olson, Porsche Drives Over Volkswagen Law, FORBES.COM, 23 October 2007: "Clever preparation
by Porsche means that Tuesday's ruling by European Court of Justice against the so-called Volkswagen
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we saw, in a ever accelerating series of Commission initiated legal actions against
member states found to be entertaining protectionist policies. 10 3 In the complex
regulatory environment of European market integration, such policies have
naturally been confronted with a host of member state reactions, often appealing to
the national interest at stake. It is in this context, that both the French and German
governments have recently undertaken attempts at identifying and protecting socalled 'core industries'. 104 It is a dynamic and tension-laden field, on which the
Commission will continue on its quest to identify European based corporations
with so-called special rights, an undertaking that has gained even more momentum
with the recent Volkswagen ruling.
Meanwhile, the Volkswagen ruling is bound to have notable impacts on the
German domestic labor regime. With Volkswagen becoming a likely takeover
victim for Porsche after the ECJ's decision, something that DER SPIEGEL called the
'triumph of the Piechokratie' °5, the fate of workers' co-determination in one of
Germany's largest employers is in a precarious state. Central to the predicament is
the competition between two models, which instead of complementing each other,
have increasingly been positioned in an oppositional and, in fact, competitive
relation. Workers' co-determination, as forming a constitutive part of the two-tier
board structure in German stock corporations with more than 500 employees, has
been a constant target of critique and polemics, while its accompanying regime of
10 6
Betriebsrfite (work councils) continued to fare comparatively more favorably.
Rushing in, biased observers fall victim to the long pronounced, comparative
efficiency of works councils cooperating with corporate management in salvaging
Law, which shields the carmaker from foreign takeovers, won't be ushering in a wave of suitors from
overseas, but will pave the way for the luxury car manufacturer to take full control of its midmarket
compatriot."
103See references, supra, note 5.

See Daniel Saam, Protectionfor domestic core enterprisesagainst direct investments by foreign-owned
investmentfunds, 1 LEGAL LATITUDES: NEWSLETTER FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC BUSINESS AND LAW
COMMUNITY 57 (2007), available at:
http://www.osgoode.vorku.ca/legallatitudes/documents/Legal Latitudes Vol 01 No 04.2df (last
visited 28 October 2007), finding such initiatives not only in Europe, but also in the United States, with
its northern neighbor Canada apparently taking a more inviting attitude towards FDI; See also David
Gow, Loss of Germany's VW law spells end of the roadfor golden shares, THE GUARDIAN, 24 October 2007
(online edition), referring to French President Sarkozy's recent renationalization interventions in the gas
and environment group, Suez.
104

105Andreas Ntlting, Der Triumph der Piechokratie,SPIEGEL
http: / /www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,513012,00.html
106For

23 October 2007, available at:
(last visited 28 October 2007).
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a concise presentation and insightful assessment, see Manfred Weiss, Labor Law, in:

INTRODUCTION To GERMAN LAW 299 (Zekoll/Reimann Ed. 2006)
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periods of crisis and austerity. Meanwhile, however, they might perhaps too easily
dismiss board co-determination. 10 7 Certainly, both sides are half correct, half
mistaken. The signal sent to foreign investors by the German system of board codetermination has for some time now been received as at best a mixed one.10 8 Yet,
to place all of one's hopes on works councils as an alternative to or possible
substitute for co-determination in the hope of maintaining a working relationship
between management and labor, risks prematurely cutting ties with a historically
grown industrial relations regime, which not only comprised the role of unions in
labor-capital negotiations, but also induced far-reaching policies regarding
vocational training, workplace protection and, to a very limited degree, corporate
decision making. 10 9 How effectively work councils will be able to negotiate the
increasing tensions between the corporation and its employee stakeholders, will
unfold within a highly contentious environment of business policy making. The
room to manoeuvre for all implicated actors is likely to become smaller rather than
bigger. The greatest victim of this fight over co-determination is, to be sure, a better
understanding of the company, in particular of its internal and external
environment, where employees, consumers, creditors and the 'society at large' are
not merely stakeholders. Looking beyond the deeply entrenched classifications and
demarcation lines along which shareholder interests are clearly distinguished from
those of stakeholders, would allow us to return with a more sober look at the
company itself. It would be here that we would begin to assess the role of
employees as something more than an 'investor risk factor', but an essential,
107Melanie

Amann, Sieg der Mitbestinunung, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 24 October 2007 (online
edition, 28 October 2007): "Und die Betriebsparteien wissen besser als der Gesetzgeber, wie ihre
Machtverhdltnisse geregelt sein sollen." See, in contrast, Peer Zumbansen, Ethikrichtliniennutzen vor
allen den A rbeitgeber, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 27 March 2007, available at:
http: //berufundchance.fazjob.net/s/Rub8EC3C0841F934F3ABA0703761B67E9FA/Doc-EAlE68B94951
848F5B77441750F152D40-ATpl-Ecommon-Scontent.html (last visited 28 October 2007).
108See, e.g., Gary Gorton/Frank A. Schmid, Capital,Labor and the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. Ass. 863 (2004); for an excellent, balanced overview of the discussion, see
Katharina Pistor, Co-determinationin Gerniany: A Socio-PoliticalModel with Governance Externalities, in:
ENIPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999); Mark J. Roe,
for a set of historical analyses of the German codetermination regimes, see already HERBERT J. SPIRO, THE
POLITICS OF GERMAN CODETERMINATION (1958); ABRAHAM SHUCHMAN, CODETERMINATION: GERMANY'S

MIDDLE WAY IN GERMANY (1957).

109
This has been a central contention among the "Varieties of Capitalism" scholars: see, e.g. Peter Hall &
David Soskice, Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in: Hall & Soskice (eds.), VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM:
THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, 1 (2001); Kathleen Thelen, Varieties of

Labor Politics in Developed Democracies, in: Hall & Soskice, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM (2001), at 71;
KATHLEEN THELEN, BEYOND CONTINUITY:INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES

(2005); Peer Zumbansen, Varieties of Capitalism and the LearningFirm: Contemporary Developments in EU
and German Company Lawv, CLPE Research Paper 21/2007, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=993910 forthcoming in EUROPEAN BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW (2008)
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powerful asset for the firm's economic performance. Of course, it is unlikely that
we would even be able to see that deep into the conundrical internal life of the
corporation, while applying our shareholder/ stakeholder, public/private
distinctions to make sense of it all. Can it be really all that difficult to heed the
insightful warnings of the past not to take such categorizations as depictions of
reality, but rather to understand them as the semantic representation of difficult but
deliberate choices?110 The dialogue between corporate lawyers and those studying
the corporation and what that term implies'1 ' has only just begun.

D. Conclusion
In the here and now, while we are waiting for signs of the ECJ's decision's impact,
they might be coming faster than expected. One day after the Court had rendered
its judgment, the Arbeitsgericht (first instance labor court) Stuttgart in Germany, too,
delivered a telling judgement. 1 2 The court dismissed the request of Volkswagen's
Betriebsrat (works council) for temporary relief (einstweiliger Rechtsschutz) against
the pending registration of the newly established company structure of Porsche as a
Societas Europaea. With their action, the workers at Volkswagen had hoped to
prohibit either the registration and/or the co-determination covenant
(Mitbestimnungsvereinbarung)between Porsche's employer and its employees, in
fear of their own co-determination rights being dramatically compromised as a
consequence of the new co-determination regime under the Porsche's Societas
Europaea. This regime' 13 offers the employer and the employees the possibility to
CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927); Robert Hale, Coercion and
Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sc. Q., 470-478 (1923); Morris Cohen, The Basis of
Contract,46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976)

110
Morris Cohen, Propertyand Sovereignty, 13

11 John Dewey, The HistoricBackground of Corporate Legal Personality,35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); Morton
Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VIRG. L. REV. 173 (1986)
2

1" ARBEIISGERICHT STUTTGART, KANIMER LUDWIGSBURG, 12 BVGa 4/07 of 24 October 2007, available at:
http://www.arbg-stuttgart.de/servlet/PB/show/1213597/12-BVGa-4-07.pdf.
"3 The regime has been established by the following legislative acts: Council Regulation (EC) No.
2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE); Council Directive 2001/86/EC
of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of
employees; both available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm The Regulation (EC) No.
2157/2001 is accompanied by a German implementation law called: GESETZ ZUR AUSFItHRUNG DER
VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 2157/2001 DES RATES VOM 8. OKTOBER 2001 OBER DAS STATUT DER EUROPAISCHEN
GESELLSCHAFT (SE) (SE-AUSFUHRUNGSGESETZ - SEAG) of 22 December 2004, BGB1. I, 3675; whereas the
Directive 2001/86 EC has been transformed into German law by GESETZ UBER DIE BETEILIGUNG DER
ARBEITNEHMER IN EINER EUROPAISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT (SE-BETEILIGUNGSGESETZ - SEBG) of 22 December
2004, BGB1. I, 3675.
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regulate the co-determination by mutual agreement before a fall-back clause kicks
in, if the negotiations fail. 114 The primary intention of the German SEBeteiligungsgesetz is to supply a legal framework for "customized forms of codetermination".115 Porsche and its own works council had made use of this
possibility expressly stated in Section 21 SE-Beteiligungsgesetz"16 by entering into a
covenant on the Porsche employees' co-determination, to be arranged in the newly
established SE.
One element, in particular, incited Volkswagen's main objection, namely a
comparatively, because numerically equal allocation of Porsche and Volkswagen
members to the supervisory board in the case that Porsche Automobil Holding SE
acquired a major stake of Volkswagen shares. The Volkswagen employees argued
that this allocation violated democratic principles. In the likely, even if not
imminent case of Porsche acquiring a majority of Volkswagen shares at a time
where the Porsche-VW co-determination battle is not put to rest and VW share
prices soar1 17, the covenant would result in Volkswagen and Porsche being able to
each delegate the same quorum of employee representatives to the supervisory
board of the SE. In effect, Porsche's 12,000 employees would have the same
influence within the supervisory board as Volkswagen's 324,000 employees. 118 In
light of such numbers, Volkswagen's objection that this allocation of
representatives violated the Principle of Democracy becomes quite graphic. 119
Following Porsche's lawyers, the Arbeitsgericht dismissed the action for temporary
relief, with which the VW employees had tried to stop Porsche's triumph march.
See Rildiger Krause, Die Mitbestimrnungder Arbeitnelaerin der Europiiischen GesellschaftBETRIEBS-

114

BERATER 1221 (2005), at 1222, who describes the negotiations before the conclusion of the covenenat as

"bargaining in the shadows of law".
115

See, supra, note 114, at 1226; also, supra, note 112, II. 2. e) bb).

116Section 21 SE-BETEILIGUNGSGESETZ states that this covenant between the employer and a delegation of

employees may determine how the supervisory board and the workers council are equipped.
I" SPIEGEL ONLINE, 3 November 2007: Machtkamnpf.Porsche verschiebt VW-Aktienkauf [Power struggle:
Porsche delays share acquisition of Volkswagen], available at:
http: / /www spiegel.de/wirtschaft/,1518,515200,OOhtml (last visited 7 November 2007)
"I Porsche worker would then have 30-times more influence as the vote of a Volkswagen worker, see
Kai Lange, Angriff aufs Gewerkschaftsparadies in: SPIEGEL-ONLINE, 24 October 2007, available at:
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,51302400.html ANSGAR SIEMENS, Wenn sie zanken Seit' and
Seit',SODDEUTSCHE.DE, 24 October 2007, available at:
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/artikel/786/139495/.
9

" ARBEITSGERICHT STUTTGART, decision of 24 October 2007, supra, note 112, at 10; see also the statement

by IG-Metall (Germany's largest singular trade union) Jairgen Peters, Angerichtetes Desaster, an interview
by Janko Tietz in:DER SPIEGEL,29 October 2007, at 108.
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The Court essentially relied on the consideration that a dispute over the formal or
substantive validity of an SE's co-determination covenant must not delay the
registration of the company. The Court explicitly recognized that the applicable
norms of the German SE-BETEILIGUNGSGESETZ do not contain such an instrument,
which - as the Court observed - would constitute a considerable pressure
instrument ("erhebliches Druckmittel"),120 one, however, that does not form part of
the co-determination negotiation regime under the SE. Meanwhile, the Court
underlined that the validity of the co-determination covenant would have to be
assessed in a regular action as compared to the temporary relief action brought by
the Volkswagen employees.
This case might be more than just a further ripple on the already troubled seas of
European Company Law. The same seems true for the ECJ's Volkswagen case. The
waters of European company law are travelled by tankers (The Commission),
submarines (investment funds), yachts (Porsche), exploration boats (expert
commissions) and large sailboats in a state of repair (the member states). Then there
are the rafts, paddling boats and canoes, steered by practitioners and scholars. All
these need to get to shore and climb the stairs to the Lighthouse from where to look
out at what has become of Clive Schmitthoff's 'European Company Law Scene'.121
But, they also need to provide a directing light to the different sea-farers
adventuring between London and Frankfurt, Paris and Amsterdam and Warsaw.
And instead of merely noting that all are being carried this way or that by the
winds of globalization, it might be timely to consider again, what different concepts
of the corporation, des Unternehmens, la societA, l'entreprise, are at stake in this
windy weather.

120

ARBEITSGERICHT

STUTTGART, KAMMER LUDWIGSBURG,

12 BVGa 4/07 of 24 October 2007, available at:

http://www.arbg-stuttgart.de/servlet/PB/show/1213597/12-BVGa-4-07.pdf,
121

Supra, note 10.

at 10

1052

GERMAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 08 No. 11

